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A FIGHT 'TILL THE DEATH:
CONGRESS'S USURPATION OF STATE COURT POWER IN END-

OF-LFE MATTERS
Leland C. Abraham
I. Introduction
In the spring of 2005, the United States Congress
passed An Act for the Relief for the Parents of Theresa
Marie

Schiavo1

("the Act") in

response to numerous

requests by Michael Schiavo, Theresa's husband, to have
Theresa's feeding tube removed. Michael Schiavo argued
that, prior to her accident, Theresa ("Terri") made oral
statements expressing her wish not to be kept alive in a
persistent vegetative state.2 The Act provided a mechanism
for the parents of Terri Schiavo to institute legal
proceedings to prevent the removal of Terri's feeding
3
tube.
Despite its numerous backers, many advocates of a
patient's right to make end-of-life decisions perceive the
Act as a step backwards.
The Act negates Michael
Schiavo's ability, as the surrogate decision-maker for Terri,
to make the decision to withhold or withdraw food that is
necessary to sustain her major life functions.
While
Michael Schiavo claims that he has empirical evidence that
Terri did not want to be kept alive in a persistent vegetative
state, the Act precludes him from fulfilling Terri's wishes

'An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L.
No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
2 In re Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
3 See An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie
Schiavo §

1
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without the threat of a lawsuit by Terri's parents. 4
Furthermore, the Act prevents Michael Schiavo from
Schiavo. 5
complying with the holding of the court in In re
In that case, the Florida District Court of Appeals refused
to grant Terri's parents relief from a trial court judgment
holding that, based on clear and convincing evidence, Terri
was in a persistent vegetative state and would have decided
to forego further use of a feeding tube. 6 While the court
ordered the feeding tube be removed under the Act,
Michael Schiavo could not comply with the court order
without the possibility of a lawsuit by Terri's parents. 7
In this note, I will first provide a brief summary of
the government's treatment of end-of-life decision-making
and how that treatment assisted in the development of the
Act. Then, I will examine the Act as it relates to the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Next, I will examine Congress's interest in this case,
showing that Congress had neither a compelling interest to
interfere with the state court's order nor a compelling
interest in passing legislation to limit the rights of Michael
Schiavo. in his capacity as surrogate decision-maker for
Terri, to fulfill Tern's wishes. Finally, I will examine the
separation of powers requirements and show that
Congress's interference in this matter was a clear
constitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine
and that, based on this violation, the Act should be
overturned on appeal.

4

id.
5In re Schiavo, 916 So. 2d at 814.
6 See id.
7See An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Schiavo § 2.
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I. Development of an Act for Relief for the Parents of
Terri Schiavo
A. Historical Perspective on End-of-Life Decision
Making
The history of an individual's right to autonomy
and self-determination is derived from several sources
including the United States Constitution 8 and state

constitutional provisions. 9 While these rights may seem to
strike a cord in the court of public opinion, no court of law
has ever held that these rights are absolute.
The patient's right to choose whether to receive
medical treatment is an issue that has been debated for
many years. Although some court opinions express the
view that a citizen has the "right to be let alone,"' 10 most
early refusals of medical treatment were disregarded, and
patients were forced to undergo treatment.11
The right to refuse treatment was debated for
decades in cases concerning competent patients who sought
to refuse medical treatment. 12

In most of those cases,

See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262
(1990) (holding that a person has a liberty interest under the Due
Process Clause to refuse unwanted medical treatment).
9 See, e.g., id; In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 922 (1976).
8

10 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
" See, e.g., Jacobson v. Mass, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (holding that the
protection of the public trumped the individual's right to refuse medical
treatment when a patient refuses a smallpox vaccination shot).
12 See, e.g., In re Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000,
1002-03 (1964)
(balancing the legal rights and responsibilities of the hospital and its
agents on one hand and the patient and her husband on the other).

3
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however, the courts denied the competent person's attempt
to refuse treatment. 13 It was not until the question of
withholding or withdrawing treatment was raised on behalf
of incompetent patients that the courts began to recognize
such a right in all patients. 14 Regarding incompetent
patients, courts rationalized that incompetent patients
should not lose their rights to autonomy and self-5
determination merely because they lack competency.'
Those patients who are incompetent have the same
decision-making rights as those who are competent, but
they need another to assist them in making such end-of-life
decisions. 16 Once the right was recognized in incompetent
patients, courts became more willing to recognize the right
of competent patients to refuse treatment as well.
Ironically, it was not until the United States Supreme Court
heard a case involving the scope of end-of-life decisionmaking for an incompetent person in a persistent vegetative
state17 that the Court addressed the issue as it relates to
competent patients.
In 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided In
re Quinlan, which became the land-mark case addressing
the rights of patients in persistent vegetative states. 18 In In
re Quinlan, a young woman was in a persistent vegetative
13 See,
1
4 See,

e.g., Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11.
e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647.
'5 Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d 417, 423 (1977).
6
1 See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221 (1985) (stating that the
court has a special responsibility to place appropriate constraints on
private decision making and to create guideposts that will help protect
people's interests in determining the course of their own lives);
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417; In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647.
17 Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.
8
1 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647.

4
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state and her breathing was assisted by a ventilator. 19 Her
father sought appointment as her guardian in order to
discontinue all extraordinary medical procedures sustaining
his daughter's life.20
The New Jersey Supreme Court
recognized that the incompetent patient had the right to
have a guardian exercise for her the same decisions she
could have made if competent and able to make them for
herself.2 1 According to the court, her guardian's power to
do this was not unconditional. 22 Before he could request
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, however, his
daughter's physicians had to conclude that there was no
reasonable possibility that she would ever emerge from the
vegetative state and regain her full cognitive abilities.23
The debate over withdrawal of nutrition and
hydration has been far-reaching. For many individuals,
artificial nutrition and hydration administered through a
feeding tube is another form of medical treatment, similar
to breathing through a ventilation system. However,
artificial nutrition and hydration bears little resemblance to
eating and drinking naturally. The procedure is invasive to
the patient's body, and most foods must be liquefied before
they are inserted into the feeding tube. There is also debate
over whether patients in persistent vegetative states suffer
24
pain associated with the removal of the feeding tube.
When it comes to the removal of a feeding tube, most
courts addressing the issue have held that a competent
19
20

1d. at 647.
d. at 651.

21 Id.

at 663.
1d. at 671.
23
1Id. at 671-72.
24 See Jeff M. Sellers, When to Pull a Feeding Tube,
CHRISTiANrrY
TODAY, May 2005, availableat
22

http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2OO5/OO5/9.48.
html.
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person, or a surrogate acting for an incompetent person, can
order the withholding or withdrawal of artificial nutrition
and hydration.25 Some courts, however, have held the
contrary, especially in cases involving incompetent
patients. 26
The next significant case addressing a patient's
right to refuse medical treatment was Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health.27 In Cruzan, the patient
was in a persistent vegetative state as a result of a car
accident. 28 Before her accident, she had made statements
to her roommate indicating that she "would not wish to
continue her life unless she could live at least halfway
normally." 29 The issue in Cruzan was whether the
Missouri standard requiring clear and convincing evidence
of a patient's wishes before withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment violated the patient's due process rights. 30 The
Supreme Court held that it did not. 31 The Court indicated
that the question of whether a constitutional right has been
violated must be determined by balancing an individual's
liberty interest against the relevant state interests. 32 The
25

See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 587 (R.I. 1988) (holding
that if an incompetent patient, when competent, would have made the
decision to refuse nutrition and hydration, a guardian ad litem may
make the decision to refuse nutrition and hydration for that now
patient).
incompetent
26
See, e.g., Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417 (Mo. 1988), arid,
497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that the decision to refuse medical
treatment must be an informed decision and in order to be informed,
patient must have capacity).
the
27
Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.
28
ld. at 265.
29
Id.at 268.
' 0 Id.at 262.
31 Id. at 285.
32 Id. at 279 (quoting Youngbanks v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321
(1982)).

6
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Court assumed that competent patients possess a liberty
interest in ordering that medical treatment be withheld or
withdrawn. 33 The Court stated that it does not, however,
violate equal protection principles to deny substitute
decision-making to incompetent patients because, unlike
competent patients, they are not able to make end-of-life
decisions. 34 The Court further stated that it is a patient's
ability to hear and understand information and make
decisions knowingly and voluntarily that distinguishes
the
35
competent patient from the incompetent patient.
While many believed that the Cruzan decision
would hinder the right of incompetent patients to have
others make treatment decisions for them, it does not seem
to have had this effect. Although the Court held that the
standard of clear and convincing evidence did not violate
the constitutional rights of the patient, the Court did not
mandate that all states adopt that burden of proof when
allowing a surrogate to make decisions for an incompetent
patient. State legislators are free to enact legislation that
protects incompetent patients' rights to have others make
end-of-life decisions for them. As a result of Cruzan and
its predecessors, most states have enacted statutes
governing the end-of-life decision making process for
incompetent patients. 3 6 These statutes may specify the
types of medical treatment that may be refused and may
separate and draw distinctions between artificial
ventilation, artificial nutrition, artificial hydration, surgery,
kidney dialysis, and medication. 3 7 Some statutes may
33

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
1d. at 287.
31 Id. at 279-80, 287.
36
See, e.g., TEN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(5) (West 2005); FLA. STAT.
ANN.
§§ 765.201-765.205, 765.301-765.305 (West 2005).
37
See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(5).
34

7
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permit nutrition and hydration to be withheld, but only
38
when certain standards are met.
Florida, the state where Michael and Terri Schiavo
resided, deals with the subject of end-of-life decision
making for incompetent patients in its statutory law. For
example, § 765.305 of the Florida Statutes Annotated states
that, in the absence of a living will, a health care surrogate,
another, 39
i.e. a person appointed to make the decisions for
is charged with deciding to withdraw or withhold lifeprolonging procedures unless the designation limits the
Absent any limitation from the
surrogate's authority.
surrogate's authority to make
the
to
patient pertaining
decisions for the patient, the only statutory limitations on
the surrogate's authority to withdraw life-prolonging
procedures are: (1) that the surrogate be satisfied that the
patient is in a persistent vegetative state, and (2) that the
patient lacks a reasonable medical probability of recovering
so that the right to decide may be exercised by the patient.
Legislators and courts are rarely faced with
scenarios where family members disagree on whether lifeprolonging procedures should be withdrawn. The parents
of Terri Schiavo had engaged in a legal battle to prevent
the removal of Terri's feeding tube. That legal battle ended
on March 16, 2005 when the Florida District Court of
Appeals upheld the Florida statute concerning a surrogate's
decision-making power to remove an incompetent person's
feeding tube. 41 Five days later, on March 21, 2005, the
United States Congress passed An42Act for the Relief of the
Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo.
3sSee id.
39 BLACK'S
40

LAW DICTIONARY 1458 (7th ed. 1999).

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.305 (West 2005).
41 In re Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814.
42 An Act

for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo.

8
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I. Due Process: A Fourteenth Amendment Analysis
The Fourteenth Amendment
of the U.S.
Constitution forbids the government from depriving an
individual of life or liberty without due process of the
law.4 3 In the more than two hundred years since the
ratification of the U.S. Constitution, the government has
taken an interest in ensuring that every citizen is provided
due process of law when engaged in legal proceedings.
The Fourteenth Amendment further provides citizens with
protection from any law which abridges the privileges or
immunities of the several states.
The Fourteenth
Amendment also affords all citizens equal protection of the
laws. 44 If a patient's interest in self-determination and
autonomy are founded on fundamental constitutional
principles, the government must demonstrate that it has a
compelling interest in overriding the patient's right to
refuse treatment, and that the means of enforcing its
interest is the least restrictive of the available
alternatives. 4 5 The Supreme Court has held that, even if a
patient's decision-making interest is not based on a
fundamental right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, the
government's restriction of that interest must satisfy a
46
rational basis test.
43

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
44Id
45 In some cases, the Supreme Court has departed from the application

of a specific standard and has employed a test that balances the
interests of the state with those of the individual and evaluates the
weight of the obstacle the state has imposed upon the citizen's exercise
of the right at issue. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.

833 (1992).
46 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-03 (1993).
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IV. The Government's Compelling Interest
Courts have traditionally recognized four interests
sufficient to override a patient's right to self-determination:
(1) preserving life; (2) protecting the interests of innocent
and (4) protecting the
third persons; (3) preventing suicide;
47
profession.
medical
integrity of the
A. Preserving Life
The government's interest in preserving life focuses
not on the life of any one individual, but rather on the value
of every person's life to society as a whole. It is an interest
based on the sanctity of life and on every individual's
dignity and worth.4 8 If the government's interest in
preserving life were found to override Terri's right to selfdetermination, the right to self-determination would be
rendered meaningless. If Congress's interest in preserving
the life of an incompetent patient is based on that
individual's dignity, then Congress cannot, in good faith,
deny Terri her right to autonomy. Moreover, if there is
clear and convincing evidence that Terri did not want to
live in a persistent vegetative state, as the court in In re
Schiavo found,49 the state should carry out her wishes.
Thus, if the government's interest is in the sanctity of life
and the individual's dignity, that interest must be honored
See Satz v. Perlnutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (1978); Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d at 425.
48 See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1220 (stating that all persons
have a fundamental right to expect that their lives will not be
against their will).
foreshortened
49
In re Schiavo, 916 So. 2d at 814.
47

10
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when the individual, facing a prolonged, painful death or
the indignity of having to be cared for by others, decides to
refuse further medical care.
The assertion that the government has a
fundamental interest in the sanctity of life may be attacked
on the ground that many states have a death penalty
designed to end the lives of those persons deemed culpable
of egregious crimes. Likewise, for those who are sick or
have various other injuries, the government's interest in
preserving their lives is hardly absolute because the
government does not guarantee health care for its citizens.
In Terri's case, the state kept her alive, against clear and
convincing evidence that she did not want to live in a
persistent vegetative state. Terri was neither honored nor
afforded dignity by the government's decision to keep her
alive against clear evidence that she would have objected to
such treatment.
In the 1970s, courts began to allow an individual's
right to self-determination to override the government's
interest in preserving life. 50 The individual's right to have
life-prolonging treatment removed or withheld was initially
recognized in cases where the invasion of the patient's
body by the treatment was great and the patient's
51
prognosis, even with treatment, was not favorable.
Today, however, it is unlikely that a court would deny a
patient's request to refuse treatment on the basis of the
government's interest in preserving life, even if the
50

See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 683 (1987) (holding

that an individual's right to chart his or her own plan of medical
treatment deserves as much, if not more, constitutionally protected
privacy than does an individual's home or automobile).
5' See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (relying on the fact that
experts did not think the patient would survive with treatment and that
the patient would certainly die without the treatment).

11
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treatment in question was commonplace. 52
In Terri's case, the court held that Terri's wishes
Congress then attempted to
should be honored.
through the Act, which
ruling
court's
circumvent the
granted Terri's parents standing to bring suit against
Michael Schiavo, Terri's surrogate decision-maker, if he
complied with the court order. 54 Here, Congress did not
show a compelling interest in the sanctity of life. Congress
simply attempted to wield its authority in this area by
overriding the state's authority. The Act did not address all
residents similarly situated to Terri's condition; it only
focused on Terri Schiavo.55 For this reason, the Act does
not show a compelling state interest in the sanctity of life.
B. Protecting Interests of Third Parties
recognized that
traditionally
Courts have
of innocent
interests
the
governmental interest in protecting
third persons is sufficient to override an individual's right
to self-determination. In In re Georgetown College, the
court allowed the state's interest in protecting innocent
third parties to override the decision of a Jehovah's
Witness patient to refuse to undergo a blood transfusion
because she was the mother of a minor child. 56 Recently,
however, courts have allowed adults to refuse life-saving or
The results could be different if the patient wanted to take active
steps, or have another person take active steps, to end the patient's life.
In the case of assisted-suicide or active euthanasia, however, the state's
interest in preserving life could prevail over the patient's interest in
autonomous decision-making.
53 See In re Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814.
54 See An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo.
" See id.
56 In re Georgetown College, 331 F.2d at 1009-10.
52

12
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life-sustaining treatment even if the refusal would mean
death, and would result in the dying patient leaving behind
minor children. 57 These cases mainly have pertained to
competent adult patients. For example, in St. Mary's
Hospital v. Ramsey, the court upheld the right of a 27-year
old Jehovah's Witness patient with one minor child to
refuse the administration of blood products. 58
If an innocent third party exists in Terri's case, that
party would be her parents. However, her parents were not
dependents and did not rely on her financially, as a minor
child would rely on a parent. Instead, Terri's parents were
seeking guardianship of Terri.59 If her parents had gained
custody of her, then Terri would have been dependent upon
them. Thus, Terri's parents would not have a claim of
abandonment as would a child whose parent chooses not to
accept life-prolonging treatment. Additionally, the court
rulings pertaining to this governmental interest have
involved competent patients. Because Terri was in a
persistent vegetative state, she was an incompetent patient.
For these reasons, the government's interest in protecting
an innocent third party fails in the case of Terri Schiavo.
C. Preventing Suicide
The government has historically recognized an
interest in preventing its citizens from committing
suicide. 60 This interest coincides with the state's interest in
the preservation of life for all its citizens, both collectively
"7See, e.g., St. Mary's Hospital v. Ramsey, 465 So.2d 666, 668 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (observing that although there is a minor
daughter, this case is difficult to categorize as abandonment).
18 See id.
59
1n re Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814.
60 In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209.
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and individually. The government's interest is relevant
here because a patient's decision to withdraw or withhold
life-prolonging treatment will lead to the patient's death,
which will occur earlier in time than if the treatment had
been continued.
For many years, courts have allowed the refusal or
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, despite the
government's interest in preventing suicide. These courts
have asserted that the patient's death was not caused by the
refusal or withdrawal of treatment, but rather by the
patient's underlying medical condition. 6 1 Courts have
distinguished the withdrawal of treatment from suicide on
the grounds that the patient's condition leading to the
treatment was not self-inflicted and the patient's intent in
refusing treatment was not to die. Rather, the intent was
conditions. 62
not to continue to live under the present
Some courts have also expressed the opinion that
withdrawal of treatment was not an action, but an omission
suicide. 63
and, therefore, could not be characterized as
Terri's expressed wish to refuse treatment cannot be
characterized as suicide. The removal of nutrition here is
not a self-inflicted procedure aimed at ending her life. It is,
rather, the omission of measures that would prolong Terri's
life in a state in which she expressly did not want to live.
This case, as courts have previously held, 64 is
See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1219 (holding that patient would
have died within one year even with the treatment); Saikewicz, 370
N.E.2d at 417.
62 See, e.g., Perlmutter, 362 So.2d. at 163 (holding that because the
61

patient did not self-inflict his condition, the refusal of treatment cannot
be characterized as suicide).
63 See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801 (1997) (distinguishing
the refusal of life-sustaining treatment and demanding life-ending
treatment).
64 See id.
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distinguishable from suicide because Terri did not express
a will to refuse treatment in order to end her life. She
expressed a desire to refuse treatment when she could not
live in a normal state. This is fundamentally different from
suicide because Terri's intent was not to end her life per se,
but to end prolonged survival in a persistent vegetative
state.
The government's interest in preventing suicide has
resurfaced in the assisted-suicide debate. The supporters of
assisted-suicide argue that, in many respects, those cases
are indistinguishable from withdrawal of treatment cases.
According to assisted-suicide proponents, there is no
difference between withdrawing treatment that results in
one's death and providing a means for one to die earlier
than would be expected from a terminal or chronic
condition. Assisted-suicide supporters do not necessarily
argue that withdrawal of treatment is not suicide, but rather
that, if a patient is allowed to hasten death through
withdrawal, the patient should be allowed to achieve the
same end through other means. 65 If the government's
interest in preventing suicide is not compelling enough to
override a patient's interest in refusing treatment, it also
should not be compelling enough to override the patient's
interest in shortening his or her life by other means.
Patients should not be forced to die from infection or from
lack of ventilation, nutrition, or hydration, rather than from
a quicker, more effective method.
Additionally,
proponents of assisted-suicide argue that withdrawal of
treatment is also an act rather than an omission. Even if
withdrawal of treatment is an omission, the law imposes
culpability for negative omissions as well as for positive
See, e.g., Quill, 521 U.S. at 807 (overruling the lower court's
assumption that individuals have a right to hasten death).
65

15
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acts. 66 Those opposed to assisted-suicide fail to recognize
a patient's constitutional right to autonomy. 6 7 Terri's
decision to refuse life-prolonging treatment is not a fight
that she should have to win in the court of public opinion,
because one goal of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution is to provide every citizen with
autonomy. 68 For these reasons, the government cannot
sustain an interest in preventing Terri's husband from
removing her feeding tube because his goal was not to help
her commit suicide, but simply to ensure that she would not
be forced to live in a permanent vegetative state.
D. Maintaining Integrity in the Medical
Profession
Another governmental interest offered in opposition
to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is the need to
maintain integrity in the medical profession. Although this
69
interest is frequently cited, it is rarely persuasive.
Members of the medical profession would argue that it is
the role of health care providers to save lives, not take
them, and that providers must have the freedom to treat
patients according to their reasonable professional
judgment. 70 Health care providers would further argue that
withholding or withdrawing treatment that results in the
66 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d. at 647 (stating that although there
are medical advances, justice will have to keep up with them).
67 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
68 Id.

69 See, e.g., Perlmutter, 362 So.2d at 163-64 (quoting Saikewicz, 370
N.E. 2d at 426-27).
70 See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d. at 668 (speaking of the need not
to inhibit the "independent medical judgments" of physicians "in the
pursuit of their healing vocation").
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death of a patient may well violate their ethical code, as
well as the code of the medical profession in general. 7 '
In this case, the medical professional's ethical
obligation is to consent to the wishes of the patient. To
deny Terri her right to self-determination would be an
egregious error on the part of the medical community. To
override clear and convincing evidence that the patient
would want to abstain from life-prolonging treatment in the
event that the patient is in a persistent vegetative state is an
authority not granted to medical professionals by any
ethical code.
Likewise, courts have rejected the argument that the
integrity of the medical profession is an interest compelling
enough to override a patient's interest in self-determination
and autonomy. 72 The courts have taken the view that the
medical profession's mission to save lives does not
mandate life-sustaining treatment in all cases, especially
those where the patient's prognosis is very poor or those in
which the patient is in great pain or is permanently
unconscious. 73 In Terri's case, she was in a persistent
vegetative state, and she did not have a prognosis of
recovery. Before her accident, Terri alluded to the fact
that, if she were ever in such a state, she would want the
life-sustaining measures halted so that she would not have
to continue to live in an abnormal manner. 74 Courts have
held that there are circumstances where appropriate
medical care is comfort care, rather than life preserving

71

See id. at 664-69.

See, e.g., Perlmutter,362 So.2d at 163-64 (stating that if the doctrine
of informed consent and privacy have as their foundations bodily
integrity, then those rights are superior to institutional considerations).
7' See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d. at 667.
74
See In re Schiavo, 916 So. 2d at 814.
72
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care. 75 For Terri, the most appropriate care would have
been comfort care, in accordance with her wishes.
Generally, if health care professionals or
institutions object to the withdrawal of treatment on
individual ethical grounds, they will not be forced to act on
the patient's wishes, so long as the patient can be
transferred to another health care provider or institution
that will help effectuate those wishes. 76 In order to comply
with Terri's wishes, someone in the medical profession
would not be forced to do something to which he or she
was ethically opposed. Thus, there was no breach of any
medical code of ethics by removing Terri's feeding tube.
For these reasons, the government's interest in maintaining
the integrity of the medical profession is irrelevant because
Terri did not commit suicide, and the professional who
ended this ordeal for her was not forced to do so.
V. The Act Versus Separation of Powers
While the ultimate decision concerning whether
Terri's feeding tube should have been removed will be
debated for many years to come, the effect of Congress's
attempt to circumvent the order of a Florida Court of
Appeals 77 is immediate. There is public sentiment that this
piece of legislation was an attempt on the part of the U.S.
Congress to usurp the authority of state law 78 and wield its
See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d. at 667 (noting that some
physicians have chosen not to prolong the process of dying for the
patient when it is clear that the patient is in an irreversible condition
and therapy offers neither human nor humane benefit).
76 But see In re Requena, 517 A.2d 886 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
affd, 517 A.2d 869 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
71986),
7
1n re Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814.
71

78

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 765.305 (West 2005).
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own authority.

79

The Act raises many constitutional inquiries and
should not survive an appeal. Generally, legislative actions
are those that have general application and prospective
effect, not those which are targeted and retroactive. 80 The
Act, however, is not merely legislation, but an attempt to
accomplish something judicial and strictly outside the role
of the legislature. Florida's Constitution clearly mandates
a separation of powers. 8 While these distinctions of power
may overlap at times, it is difficult to find a constitutional
basis for Congress's overruling a court order.
The
legislature, dissatisfied with the court order, granted Terri's
parents standing to sue Michael Schiavo, even though the
United States Supreme Court had already ruled that
82
Congress may not interfere with judicial proceedings.
Thus, the legislature should not have granted relief to
Terri's parents because such relief was strictly judicial in
nature. Congress should have adhered to the separation of
powers principle as mandated by the nation's highest court.
It can hardly be argued that the courts are the best
mechanism for determining end-of-life decisions. Because
there is no universal statute to govern such decisions, states
have devised their own statutes regarding who should make
79 Barbara A. Noah, Politicizing the End of Life:

Lessons From the
Schiavo
Controversy,
59
U.
MIAMI
L.
REv.
107,
115-16
(2004).
8
oId. at 117 (quoting Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivi , and Legal Change: An
Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1055, 1057 (1997)
(explaining that the "general principle that statutes operate
prospectively and judicial decisions apply retroactively is a matter of
black letter law")).
8' See FLA. CONST. ART. II, § 3 ("The powers of the state government
shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No
person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining
to
either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein.").
82
See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995).
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end-of-life decisions. If the legislature was diametrically
opposed to the language of a statute, it has the authority to
amend such a statute. This, however, is a matter that
Congress should not have decided by judicial means. The
legislature cannot usurp the power of the courts, especially
after a particular matter has been decided. The courts are
committed to upholding the legislature's authority by
rendering opinions consistent with the statutes, which is
The
exactly what the court did in Terri's case. 83
of
constraints
to
the
true
remain
should
turn,
legislature, in
the statute, which requires that these matters be decided in
a court of law.
It is important to note that there were alternative
routes the legislature could have followed. For example, a
private bill would not have offended the Constitution on the
scale that Congress's usurpation of judicial power has.
There is no provision in the U.S. Constitution that prohibits
private bills. Because Terri made it clear that she did not
want to live in a persistent vegetative state, as determined
by the Florida courts, 84 it is unlikely that she would have
perceived such a bill as favorable to her cause.
State elected officials take an oath to abide by their
state constitutions. When Congress is allowed to override
the authority of a state constitution, an extreme limitation is
placed on the states' authority-one the Framers of the
U.S. Constitution may not have envisioned. 85 It can be
argued that the separation of powers discussed in the
Florida Constitution 86 is to be respected by the U.S.
Congress. Just as the states are not allowed to infringe on
the decisions of the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Congress
See In re Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814.
id.
85 See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
86 See FLA. CONST. ART. II, § 3.
83

84 See
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should not be allowed to overrule decisions made by the
state and wield its own authority.
The other instances in which legislatures have
interfered in family matters have also led to similar results.
The Schiavo case bears some semblance to a recent federal
decision regarding child custody. 87 Dr. Eric Foretich and
his wife, Dr. Elizabeth Morgan, separated while Dr.
Morgan was pregnant with their daughter, and they
divorced shortly after their daughter's birth. 8 The D.C
Superior Court gave custody to Dr. Morgan, while Dr.
Foretich retained visitation rights. 89 Dr. Morgan did not
allow Dr. Foretich to visit his daughter, however, claiming
he had sexually molested the girl. 9° The courts never
found evidence of inappropriate behavior on the part of Dr.
Foretich and jailed Dr. Morgan on contempt of court
charges. 91 Afterward, she fled with her daughter to New
Zealand. 92 At Dr. Morgan's request, Congress passed the
Elizabeth Morgan Act, 93 which allowed Dr. Morgan to
return to the United States without being subjected to the
jurisdiction of the D.C. Superior Court. The Elizabeth
Morgan Act also prevented Dr. Foretich from visiting his
daughter unless his daughter consented. 94 Similar to the
legislature's intervention in the Schiavo case, the Elizabeth
Morgan Act referred specifically to the Morgan-Foretich
dispute. Dr. Foretich contested the legislation arguing it

87
88

89

See Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
See id. at 1204-05.
Id. at 1205.

90°Id
9

lId. at

1205-06.
Id. at 1207.
93 Id. at 1207.
94
Id. at 1208.
92
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95
was a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, an
96
argument the U.S. Court of Appeals accepted. The U.S.
Court of Appeals concluded that the Act was a punitive
measure that was designed to separate Dr. Foretich from
his daughter. 97 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied
on the legislative history which spoke to the effect of the
dispute. 98
Act's aim to "correct an injustice" in the custody
The Act granting Terri's parent's relief has little
distinction from the Elizabeth Morgan Act. While the Act
passed by Congress on behalf of Terri's parents does not do
the same damage to Michael Schiavo's reputation as the
Elizabeth Morgan Act did to Dr. Foretich's reputation, the
two acts are nonetheless similarly detrimental to the
separation of powers doctrine. The cases are remarkably
similar in that both involve the same questions and
constitutional misgivings. On this basis, the Act violates
the separation of powers doctrine and is therefore void.

VI. Conclusion
Congress's attempt to circumvent the Florida
court's decision regarding the removal of Terri Schiavo's
feeding tube violated her fundamental constitutional rights.
She is guaranteed a right to autonomy 99 and she has a right
to self-determination based on that right. Congress's
attempt to usurp the state court's power not only violated
Terri's constitutional rights, but it also offended the
Framers' intent to afford states autonomy. Furthermore,
Id. at 1208-09.
1226.
97
Id. at 1223.
98 See id. at 1225-26.
99 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (stating
that the right to autonomy is a fundamental constitutional right).
96Id. at
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Congress has failed to show a compelling governmental
interest by which to override the personal choice of Terri
Schiavo. As a result, the Act is not constitutionally sound
and should be overturned on appeal.
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